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ARTICLE
Freedom can also be productive: the historical inversions of
‘the conduct of conduct’
Carlos Palacios
Department of Sociology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
The Foucauldian conception of power as ‘productive’ has left us so
far with a residual conception of freedom. The article examines a
number of historical cases in which ‘relationships of freedom’ have
potentially come into existence within Western culture, from ‘revo-
lution’ and ‘political truth-telling’ to ‘cynicism’ and ‘civility’. But the
argument is not just about demonstrating that there have in fact
been many historical inversions of ‘the conduct of conduct’. It is
about theorizing how freedom can be ‘productive’ or give rise to
cultural norms if any such inversion can only come into being as






Freedom does not seem to exist for Foucault except as a condition for power. This, of
course, is not objectionable in itself. Nothing, in fact, is objectionable in principle when
social life is interpreted as a combative struggle through the lens of a pervasive power.
That nothing is fundamentally objectionable does not mean, however, that one cannot
object. For Foucault, the upside of an analysis of experience in terms of power is
precisely the opposite: one can always object. The modern individual may remain a
‘subject’, but a subject that is always free to resist an injunction by considering ‘other
reasonable options’ (Foucault 1997, p. 296).
While there is an essential freedom to intervene in the direction of one’s own life and
that of others in this scheme, a freedom that Judith Butler (2002) suggests is always
‘critical’, in the sense of interrogatory, this is still a freedom that can never really be
expected to have a productivity on its own. If, ‘following Foucault, we [have come to]
understand power as forming the subject as well, as providing the very conditions of its
existence and the trajectory of its desire’ (Butler 1997b, p. 2, original emphasis), it must
be equally recognized how, thanks to him, we have also come to understand freedom as
not forming or producing the subject. The discursive norms that allow us to recognize
ourselves as beings of some sort or another exclusively belong to the history of power
(Butler 1997a, p. 28–38). While freedom may add an element of ‘inventiveness’ (Butler
2005, p. 18) to our self-formation and arts of existence, it is nonetheless bound to
remain in the margins of our historical self-intelligibility.
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Foucault tends to reduce the role of freedom in human relationships to a residual,
albeit indispensable, factor. It is a factor that provides political hope to the extent that
an ontological condition of freedom allows us to imagine that human ‘relationships are
in perpetual slippage from one another’ and are hence analyzable with a critical lens in
terms of ‘strategics’ and ‘reversibility’ (Foucault 2007a, p. 65–66). But the freedom of a
subject that can object but never truly create cannot be other than disruptive (see e.g.
Isin 2012, p. 119–126). Its actual products, what it produces, must take again the form
of power. Another iteration of ‘the conduct of conduct’ must follow, even if from a
certain comparative angle it is possible to think of these products as ‘counter-conducts’
(see Davidson 2011, p. 27).
Isin (2012) has explored how the critical potential of such residual moments of
freedom may be crystallized into more stable claims in a political culture by taking the
form of a certain right. Thus, he has been able to reach beyond the frame of ‘counter-
conduct’ by considering how ‘acts of citizenship’ can leave a recognizable trace and
through their disruptions materialize a progressive and continuing demand for the right
to have rights. I intend to go even further in this paper and contend that freedom has a
productivity of its own, one that does not require a framework of sovereign or
governmental power to be readable as socially eﬀective. This productivity was broadly
articulated by Butler long ago, even if she has never left an understanding of freedom as
residual:
I would suggest that a fundamental mistake is made when we think that we must sort out
philosophically or epistemologically our ‘grounds’ before we can take stock of the world
politically or engage in its aﬀairs actively with the aim of transformation. The claim that
every political action has its theoretical presuppositions is not the same as the claim that
such presuppositions must be sorted out prior to action. It may be that those presupposi-
tions are articulated only in and through that action and become available only through a
reﬂective posture made possible through that articulation in action. (Butler 1995, p.
128–129)
Through a ‘reﬂective posture’, freedom has the capacity to give rise to social norms,
norms that may be of a very particular type, but that still manage to shape our ways of
relating to each other and aﬀect the process of self-formation. Freedom can do more
than disrupt power, reverse power and then translate into power in order to become
productive. It can become its own reﬂection, a full-ﬂedged inversion of ‘the conduct of
conduct’. Most of the time, these inversions escape articulation, history forgets them
and their ‘grounds’ never solidify. But, on occasion, they enter and become part of life
and enliven discourse, becoming thinkable forms of practice that, although not always
successful, can still endure their own contingency and even give rise to their own
cultural convention.
This article examines a number of historical cases in which it can be potentially said
that ‘relationships of freedom’ have come into existence within Western culture, from
‘revolution’ and ‘political truth-telling’ to ‘cynicism’ and ‘civility’. The argument, how-
ever, will not just be about demonstrating that there have in fact been many ‘historical
inversions’ of the conduct of conduct, but, more broadly, about making the point that
all such inversions must be qualiﬁed as ‘historical’ to the extent that they constitute, in
every instantiation, an event in itself. The ﬁrst part of the paper explores a way of
conceiving a sociology of freedom within the very conceptual terms of ‘historical
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problematology’ established, or at least reﬁned, by Foucault (see e.g. Osborne 2003,
Rabinow 2003). Then, based on this conceptualization of freedom, the second part
embarks on a reﬂection upon the increasingly unthinkable phenomenon that is freedom
as a type of productive force eﬀectively shaping relationships with oneself and others.
The discussion will remain within the limits of post-structural theory throughout the
paper. The conclusion elaborates, however, on why, unlike liberal-democratic theory,
this theoretical tradition may still be able to ﬁnd critical advantages in a marked
opposition between power and freedom.
2. Beyond a sociology of power
Can freedom, as Hannah Arendt (1998, p. 190–191) in her own style of theorization
long ago contended, at rare times have a productivity of its own and form actual
relationships? Further, might freedom even have its own productive dimension within
most relationships, just as many of us have come to assume with Foucault that power
does? Arendt’s account of the experience of power as a matter of mutuality and political
vibrancy is empirically suggestive and particularly useful to open up a conception of
productive freedom. I will in fact regard her work in the second part of the paper as the
ideal entry point into a reﬂection on freedom’s own type of social eﬀectivity or
‘productivity’. But in none of her accounts can one ﬁnd a historicist deﬁnition of
freedom as a situated form of problematization. She did of course meticulously explore
the historical emergence of what she saw as a rather spontaneous, if contingent, faculty
(see e.g. Arendt 1978, 2005). But I would like to examine the historicity of freedom as a
problem or as just another problematic of thought within the multiple games of truth of
Western culture, and, to this end, Foucault’s own work can be uniquely elucidating.1
Foucault may not have been as closed oﬀ to the consideration of freedom on its own
as we have come to believe. As he revealingly confessed during a roundtable discussion
after his lecture What is Critique?, he did not ‘absolutely’ reject but had simply been
avoiding for a long time ‘the problem of will’ and ‘originary freedom’ (Foucault 2007a,
p. 75–76). In particular, there is a strong emphasis during his two last courses at the
Collège de France on the idea of political truth-telling or parrhesia as ‘actually the
exercise, the highest exercise, of freedom’ (Foucault 2011, p. 67). In fact, in a way,
Foucault assumes freedom to be much more of an ‘ontological condition’ than Arendt,
as he himself once put it (Foucault 1997, p. 284). One could say that he just never
encountered a way of synthetically grasping this widely relevant condition through a
historicist method just as he was able to do with power through ‘the conduct of
conduct’. Before delving into this mode of interpretation, however, I would like to
consider brieﬂy the established interpretation of Foucault’s sociology of human rela-
tionships – particularly with the help of Butler, even if Butler will be equally helpful to
go beyond the frame of power.
2.1. Residual power
‘From the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another . . . slavery
and misery were soon seen to germinate’ (Rousseau 1923, p. 214–215). As analysts of
power have done since the time of Hobbes and Rousseau, Foucault recognizes in
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human relationships something essentially tragic. What diﬀers in his conception is
the way he turns this tragedy on its head. If every social relationship can be said to
be one where ‘one person tries to control the conduct of the other’, it ‘is because
there is freedom everywhere’ (Foucault 1997, p. 291–292). ‘Power’, whether it is a
perceived boundary for conduct or an immediate threat of force, is characterized in
this scheme for expecting a certain reaction from the individual. Yet, in their
condition of freedom, individuals can choose to be skeptical, do something unex-
pected and alter a pressure situation in some way. As Foucault explains, ‘if there
were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, ﬂight, deception, strategies
capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power relations at all’
(Foucault 1997, p. 292).
Foucault does not follow the pessimism of Hobbes, who once tragically imagined
that we all are by nature skeptical subjects, beings that lack an inner sense of morality, a
distinct capacity for dispassionate deliberation, and a fundamental concern for anything
other than self-preservation (Hobbes 1998, p. 85, 39–40, 88). His insight is rather that
being skeptical is always a potential alternative for the very reason that we can all strive
to be ethical, reﬂect on our own about what is right, and choose between at least a few
options of conduct and forms of existence. His reply to Rousseau’s lamentation, in this
same positive vein, would be that, even in the worst of cases like slavery, ‘a power can
be exercised over the other only insofar as the other still has the option of killing
himself, of leaping out the window, or of killing the other person’ (Foucault 1997,
p. 292).
In principle, a ‘skeptical’ attitude could be seen as a void, as a position that, already
lacking any content itself, goes on to empty of meaning and value whatever discourse,
theory or opinion it confronts by destabilizing even its most commonsensical premises
and scavenging for disproving counterfactuals (see e.g. Butler 1997b, p. 45). Foucault
went beyond this extreme interpretation, endowing the capacity for skepticism with a
certain general value, yet he still rejected the possibility that a skeptical subjectivity
could come up with any content of its own.2 He could at most refer us to a ‘limit-
attitude’ or ‘the undeﬁned work of freedom’ (Foucault 2007a, p. 113–114). Even if it is
the case that the large majority of individuals have a certain freedom to be skeptical as
part of their ontological condition, the expression of that skepticism, for Foucault,
cannot in itself be productive. Our inner skeptic only amounts to a ‘virtual “instant”’ or
‘gesture’ of reﬂection (Rossi 2017, p. 346–347) – while sociologically absent, it accounts
for the freedom that is left from a social world in contention.
In certain lectures, Foucault gave more genealogical shape to this thesis by tracing
the development of our skeptical capacity through the historical case of the ‘critical’
attitude. It is in this vein that he explored, for example, the ‘perpetual question’ of ‘how
not to be governed like that’ (Foucault 2007a, p. 44, original emphasis) and its
correlative notion of ‘counter-conduct’, explaining how this term was able to avoid a
potential ‘substantiﬁcation’ of the critical subject, as would be the case with notions like
‘dissident’ (Foucault 2007b, p. 202). He wanted to avoid suggesting, in other words, that
there was anything unique to the experience of ‘counter-conduct’ that was not already
found in the conceptualization of ‘conduct’, beyond a certain critical correlation in
regards to pre-existing power, one ‘that may well be found in fact in delinquents, mad
people, and patients’ (ibid., p. 202).
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Paying particular attention to Foucault’s last lectures on ethics, Butler has further
elaborated on the singular ‘critical move’ embedded in Foucault’s sociology of power as
one where the relation between a subject and a moral system is ‘neither predictable nor
mechanical’ (Butler 2002, p. 217):
The injunction compels the act of self-making or self-crafting, which means that it does not act
unilaterally or deterministically upon the subject. It sets the stage for the subject’s self-crafting,
which always takes place in relation to an imposed set of norms. (Butler 2005, p. 18–19)
Themoment one has to create a narrative to give an account of oneself or deploy speech (or
conduct) in some way to address others, one and others become subjects that are open to
revision. The reiteration of any social form of intelligibility always poses a risk, for the cost
is that one may well be transforming the terms through which we have come to eﬀect
mutual understanding and recognition, however fair or injurious these terms are (Butler
1997a, 2005). But, if there is always a chance for a felicitous performative eﬀect in this risk, it
is only to bring about a ‘re-signiﬁcation’ of those norms (e.g. Butler 1997a, p. 41), norms
that will in any case continue to interpellate us as ‘subjects’, even if, in the case that the re-
signiﬁcation is successful, as subjects with a horizon of activity and agency that has been
‘renewed’ (Butler 2010, p. 150). While Butler has come to stress the more unexpected and
‘perlocutionary’ aspects of this subject renewal (ibid., p. 147–154), and even the less
‘inadvertent’ forms of political agency it can include, such as performative alliances
achieved through assembly (Butler 2015, p. 32), it is still the case that ‘iterability thus
becomes the non-place of subversion, the possibility of a re-embodying of the subjectivat-
ing norm that can redirect its normativity’ (Butler 1997b, p. 99). She can only frustratedly
refer us to ‘something like the unconscious of power’, since freedom remains for her, at its
most independent, a matter of ‘productive iterability’ (ibid., p. 104).
Freedom appears in a strict Foucauldian reading as that space which gives indivi-
duals the opportunity to modify and react to their existing relationships, to themselves
act upon conducts, but never as a speciﬁc form of relating to others in itself. In most
human relationships, there would be room for skepticism: whatever I am invited to do
or think or say is only an option and not necessarily the best one for one’s case. But
from that skepticism can only come out another, modiﬁed relationship of power – not
necessarily one that involves an Other, but simply it could appear inasmuch as one then
seeks another form of conducting oneself. In this view, a critical sociology of freedom
could only ultimately refer us to either a world with a ‘minimum of domination’
(Foucault 1997, p. 298–299), in which everyone’s active, tireless skepticism constantly
keeps power at bay, preventing the establishment of dominant relationships; or a world
with a ‘cynical’ ethics or philosophy, in which everyone’s skepticism turns inward
forming a mode of existence based on the rejection of this life and all of its expressions
of power, and on an orientation to an ‘other world’ which can only be negatively
deﬁned as one where ‘every individual forms a vigilant relationship to self’ (Foucault
2012, p. 315). In other words, from this perspective, the freedom of a skeptic can only
become productive through power. This is a skeptic that can only become critical of
things, and out of that criticism relationships of power either become more agonistic, or
one’s conduct of the self becomes more ‘cynical’, in the ancient sense recovered by
Foucault of having to put everything into question as part of one’s moral mission (see
e.g. Foucault 2012, p. 284–285).3
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2.2. Relationships of freedom
Foucault explored the philosophical tradition of Cynicism as part of a much wider
investigation into the ancient practice of parrhesia. This practice was examined from
many diﬀerent angles and at a variety of junctures in Antiquity during his last three courses
at the Collège de France (Foucault 2004, 2011, 2012), describing, not always chronologically,
the transition of parrhesia from a political form of truth-telling that could bring about an
ethical diﬀerentiation among the vocal citizens of the polis, to a muchmore personal ascetic
exercise that could just be practiced among friends or strangers if with beneﬁcial side eﬀects
for the body politic. It is the beginning of this transition which can be illuminating for a
problematological sociology of freedom, before a political and largely spontaneous par-
rhesia becomes a whole ethical philosophy of life and aesthetic programme of conduct or
‘art of existence’ (see e.g. Foucault 2012, p. 160–163).
It may be true that Foucault’s interest in this cultural practice that consisted of
speaking one’s mind during the Greek assembly came from the opposite direction.
He postulated it as the ﬁrst formulation of governmentality (Foucault 2011, p. 159).
And yet, while parrhesia clearly appears as linked to the whole political structure of
ancient democracy in his analysis, the practice itself of this fearless truth-telling does
not seem to consist of governing oneself or others – the latter is rather a develop-
ment that follows the crisis of a political model organized around parrhesia. Before
this democratic crisis and ethico-political transformation that Foucault locates at the
start of the fourth century B.C. occurs, parrhesia simply appears as the prerequisite
for a functional government.4 While later it becomes the very foundation of conduct
in Greek culture, for the prince as much as for the ordinary citizen (see e.g.
Foucault 2012, p. 86), in its classical form parrhesia unquestionably stands for an
expression of freedom.
In a sense, parrhesia was the right to freedom that the (male) citizens of Athens
and other city-states possessed by virtue of being born there, the democratic right to
speak freely to all the other citizens of the polis and engage in an agonistic politics
of rational debate (Foucault 2011, p. 105, 2012, p. 34–35). But that this was a right
only meant that a certain number of individuals could venture putting it into
practice. This is perhaps why someone like Arendt compares the law of the polis
to a ‘wall’ or ‘enclosure’ (1998, p. 63–64; see also Arendt 2005, p. 121–130). For the
freedom that parrhesia entails is deﬁnitely not one that can be granted or obtained
by means of a right. As Foucault remarks to his audience, it does not refer to ‘the
freedom of speech’ (Foucault 2011, p. 188). It involves a mode of acting and relating
to others and oneself; in precise terms, a ‘dangerous exercise of freedom’ (ibid.,
p. 67). The one who spoke frankly in the assembly and told the ‘truth’ was always
taking a considerable risk. A truth-teller is, as Socrates would later on articulate, the
one who says what he thinks, in his own ordinary language, and using ‘no more
than the series of words and phrases which occur to him’ (ibid., p. 313). Being this
open about one’s true thoughts and leaving the art of rhetoric behind represented
an act of courage, to the extent that it exposed an unﬁltered individual to the
reactions of high-ranking citizens, who were in a way his political rivals, and who
could be justiﬁed in being critical of him and even taking extreme measures such as
ostracizing him, exiling him or condemning him to death.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL POWER 257
It is in the contrast Foucault draws between rhetoric and parrhesia that the distinc-
tion between power and freedom becomes most deﬁned: ‘rhetorical language is a
language chosen, fashioned, and constructed in such a way as to produce its eﬀect on
the other person’ (ibid., p. 314). The very purpose of rhetoric is to create a ‘bond of
power’, Foucault aﬃrms, through the use of a certain skill and well-deﬁned technique
which consists of styling discourse in such a way that it becomes believable and
persuasive (Foucault 2012, p. 14). To be a successful rhetorician one does not need to
convey a truth one trusts thus revealing one’s inner thoughts, but only to produce a
sense of conviction in the listener. It is the art by which one forges ‘a constraining bond
between what is said and the person or persons to whom it is said’ (ibid., p. 13). The
parrhesiastes, on the other hand, practically seeks to break that bond, in the sense that,
without risking exposure, he could not be a truth-teller – he could not attach his
‘signature’ to what he says, and aﬃrm that his speech belongs to his own opinion rather
than being borrowed through the mastery of discourse from an agreeable understand-
ing of things. His speech is inherently polemic and localized. If it requires courage it is
because it calls him to express what he thinks is true and appropriate in relation to a
very speciﬁc situation, even if doing so involves putting in danger the very continuity of
his immediate relationships (ibid., pp. 10–14).
Whether the parrhesiastic act of a citizen was found to be distasteful and oﬀensive
or it was rather welcomed, a relationship of freedom would have been initiated. It
was the democratic principle born in Athens that all citizens should be able to
establish such relationships and gain through them the virtue and right to govern
others (Foucault 2011, p. 155–158). That those relationships were made possible
thanks to a cultural convention does not mean that they pointed to a calculated form
of conduct; that ultimately they belonged to the dimension of power. I delve into this
issue in the second part of the paper. At this point, I would instead like to draw what
I think is a reasonable generalization about what diﬀerentiates a relationship of
freedom from one of power.
2.3. Freedom as its own problem
Mirroring Foucault’s memorable construct, it becomes possible to suggest that there are
relationships or at least moments in a relationship that are not about the conduct of
conduct but rather about the ‘reﬂection of reﬂection’; about managing to reﬂect in
practice one’s own reﬂections.5 For an individual to relate through freedom, ‘reﬂection’
is doubly signiﬁcant. It is ﬁrst of all what prompts agency in this case, for a relationship
of freedom stems from a desire to manifest one’s inner thoughts to what broadly
speaking can be considered to be the currently powerful. It is that desire which carries
the action rather than a calculation of conduct, which means that it is a type of agency
that is at the same time characterized by the hope that out of such a risky performance
something meaningful can emerge – through the expectation that whatever is ‘reﬂected’
in action can manage to incite a productive rather than repressive reaction. The
orientation of the subject’s desire can in this case be ‘apprehended’ but not always
‘recognized’ (Butler 2016, p. 3–11).
Freedom would refer to all those human initiatives and forms of expression that
strive to ‘reﬂect’ an individual’s own personal take or ‘reﬂection’ on a certain matter,
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regardless of their position vis-à-vis the materiality of power (as embodied in present
discourse, knowledge, institutions, status, etc.). What is reﬂected in practice will never
be an exact mirror image of what one would have wanted to do or say – this is what
Butler would call the performative element of our conduct. But this does not necessarily
mean that freedom is a kind of surplus of power, the unexpected side of every
performance (c.f. Butler 1997b). The implication of the performative is rather that,
the less calculated an action is, that is, the more open it is to articulate rather than
reiterate, the higher the chance that this action will cost us (see Butler 2005,
p. 120–135). Speaking or acting in a way that reﬂects one’s own peculiar reﬂections is
never easy or straightforward. It threatens the performer with the risk of losing herself
in an action that is not fully intelligible to her or anyone else, and, in cases like
parrhesia, of undermining her standing in society in some considerable way.
Instead of referring us to a highly deﬁnable ‘conduct’, this deﬁnition uses the two
meanings of the term ‘reﬂection’, whose contours in each case are intentionally hazy. In
the ﬁrst term, the allusion is to a certain transparency in behavior that diﬀers from the kind
of agendas and desires of control that populate conduct.6 Yet, what is captured is only a
‘reﬂection’, a glimpse of meaningfulness, what Arendt would call an ‘appearance’ (see e.g.
Arendt 1978, p. 21; 1998, p. 179). We need to speak in terms of appearances or ‘reﬂections’
when we recognize that only ‘up to a point we can choose how to appear to others’ and, at
times, we are ‘willing to risk the disclosure’ (Arendt 1978, p. 34; 1998, p. 180, original
emphasis). Those moments of freedom, when a well-known and pre-structured narrative
does not guide the instrumentalization of our conduct, may not allow for an objective or
clear-cut interpretation of what we are trying to express, but they do suggest to our
spectators that there is at stake a distinct way of approaching a situation. That distinct
way is in turn marked by the second term, ‘reﬂection’ in the sense of mental reasoning. The
reference is again here non-speciﬁc. It does not point to ‘reﬂexivity’ as some kind of special
human capacity in the way many late-twentieth century sociologists did (see Rose 1996).
The diﬀerence with ‘conduct’ would not be that in these cases there is more thinking
involved. Following Foucault, one can say that there is ‘thought’ in every human practice,
regardless of how purposeful or automated it is (Foucault 1988, p. 155). ‘Reﬂection’ simply
refers us to what a speciﬁc individual thinks, to a precise locus, rather than to an
immediately recognizable and therefore generic calculation for conduct.
The fact that this deﬁnition accepts that every individual can have a particular way of
seeing the world due to her partial position in it does associate it with the epistemological
view of Arendt, who, similarly drawing on a Socratic contrast with rhetoric, invites us to
acknowledge the unique standpoint of every human being, the perspectival ‘dokei moi’ or
‘it-seems-to-me’ (Arendt 1978, p. 21, 2005, p. 12–15). Yet, this association does not make
this deﬁnition reliant on an existential phenomenology or fundamental faculty. It rather
assumes that human experience has been historically organized around diﬀerent kinds of
problems, and that, at least in our culture, one of those problems has been that of how to act
in a way that reﬂects one’s own reﬂections – just as another one has been that of how to
adequately direct conduct.7 This problematization of freedom has existed at least since the
origins of democracy with parrhesia, when being vocal about what one truly thought
became a cardinal political task. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the way I have chosen
to deﬁne it does capture ‘freedom’ as the exact opposite of ‘power’ – which makes this
deﬁnition more and, perhaps at the same time, less arbitrary.
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A relationship of freedom requires the presence of power precisely in the same way a
relationship of power requires the presence of freedom. If the exercise of power consists
in directing the conduct of free individuals who could just as well act otherwise, the
exercise of freedom consists in challenging the perception of powerful subjects who
could just as well take their own understanding for granted. For freedom to become a
problem there must be a minimum of – material, not relational – power, a risk in
articulating one’s tentative thoughts. Every time something is left unsaid in a conversa-
tion due to the fear of the reactions and repercussions that saying so could cause (e.g.
looking out of place, being yelled at, losing status, receiving a disciplinary response, etc.)
is a time when the opportunity for a relationship of freedom has been lost. Without the
feeling that there is a certain level of risk in the way one would be perceived if one were
to express oneself openly and without calculation, freedom is no longer a problem – or
at least the reﬂection of reﬂection in one’s case becomes a given.
I explain freedom in this way in order to show how closely its deﬁnition mirrors
Foucault’s conception of power, where for example he states that:
power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free. If one of them were
completely at the other’s disposal and became his thing, an object on which he could
wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn’t be any relations of power.
(Foucault 1997, p. 292)
But in spite of the parallel that I have drawn with Foucault’s mode of description – the way
both power and freedom could be said to ontologically require each other’s presence – the
truth is that, even in the extreme states of absolute resistance and absolute domination a
certain problem, in each case, remains. One could say that the history of power as the
conduct of conduct actually begins with the problem of the sovereign who, having complete
authority and control over his subjects, still does not know what to order. For a king it may
be unproblematic to wield power, in the sense that its application is likely to reach its aim
and subjugate the target to his will. Yet, the problem that started with thinkers like
Machiavelli is that of what the orientation of this will should be, the principle of its
rationality (Foucault 2007b, p. 242–248; Hirschman 1997, p. 33–35; c.f. Dean 2013,
p. 71–74). Directing conduct really creates, then, two problems of calculation, one regarding
its tactics (a ‘how’ problem) and another one regarding its programmes (a ‘what’ problem).
In the case of freedom, the problem in general is not one of calculation but one of
courage – although not because exposing one’s reﬂections solely depends on the will-
power of the individual. There will always be contexts that encourage more, or less, this
problematization of experience (as Arendt for example argued, in an authoritarian
regime the citizen completely loses her capacity to intervene and express herself
through freedom: there is an ‘impotence or complete powerlessness’ that cannot be
reproached (Arendt 2003, p. 43)). Nevertheless, it is still the case that all relationships of
freedom stem from a certain individual skepticism and that they cannot come into
existence without a measure of courage. One may have inﬁnitely imaginative and
incisively critical ‘reﬂection’, but unless the risk to express and embody that reﬂection
is taken, that critical purview cannot give rise to a relation of freedom. Someone within
a social movement relates to others in terms of freedom, for example, not the moment
she ﬁnds herself in her own mind to be fully convinced of a diﬀerent way of judging
things, next to others who have also come to that understanding. A relation of freedom
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would rather appear in those moments she displays a certain courage to risk uncer-
tainty, when she is confronted with others who have a settled view of things and, in
deciding to communicate or manifest her more or less elaborate skepticism, she knows
she is exposing herself to the possibility of seeming unrecognizable, unintelligible,
unbearable, even to herself.
A certain courage is still needed, then, even when the materiality of power is absent,
with its normative force and disciplinary threat. To take an extreme example on which I
will soon elaborate, even when revolutionaries are successful in their interventions and
are no longer exposed to the risk caused by the immediate presence of power, they still
engage in relationships of freedom due to the courage that it takes to act with
uncertainty, without a reliable common ground. In such a scenario, one must have
the courage to explore questions of truth by oneself and deal with the incipiency of
meaningful practice.
3. The productivity of freedom
Just as a state of domination became something thinkable for Foucault at some point, that
state in which freedom is nulliﬁed or, better, practiced ‘only unilaterally’ (Foucault 1997,
p. 283), we have considered as a real possibility the opposite scenario: that of a relation-
ship in which calculation is absent or at least momentarily left aside by one of the parties.
The fact that all individuals necessarily aﬀect and inﬂuence each other through what they
do and that they could always come up with an answer as to what could be expected to
follow from their actions is not suﬃcient reason to assume that their mutual reactions are
universally reducible to some passive or active form of ‘the conduct of conduct’. The
agonism of their relationships can just as well be the eﬀect, on occasion, of creative acts of
freedom. Departing from an unexpected ‘action’ rather than a calculative ‘conduct’,
Arendt, for example, makes this very point: ‘Since action acts upon beings who are
capable of their own actions, reaction, apart from being a response, is always a new action
that strikes out on its own and aﬀects others’ (1998, p. 190).
It becomes relevant, in this rather Arendtian light, to include within the produc-
tivity of value and meaning that results from any social relationship a potential for
eﬀects that belongs, properly speaking, to freedom rather than power. One may not
have to stray too far from the current understanding of the Foucauldian subject in
order to incorporate this possibility (c.f. Luxon 2008). If, as Arnold Davidson has
reminded us, Foucault sociologically departs from a ‘multiplicity of force relations
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organization’ (Foucault 1998, p. 92), then freedom can simply be taken to be at
times one of those immanent forces. Davidson’s commentary can be illuminating in
this sense:
A force is not a metaphysical substance or abstraction, but is always given in a particular
relation; a force can be identiﬁed as any factor in a relation that aﬀects the elements of the
relation; anything that inﬂuences the actions of individuals in relation, that has an eﬀect on
their actions, is in this sense a force (Davidson 2011, pp. 28, original emphasis)
Nevertheless, while a deﬁnition of freedom based on the courageous confrontation of
power and the autonomous exploration of truth may lead to this conclusion, it says
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little about how this inverse force can be studied and evidenced in concrete cases. ‘The
subject’, as a normative fold that is invariably ‘subjected’, remains untouched. With the
help of Arendt, Richard Sennett and, again, Foucault, I will now explore the matter of
how relationships of freedom can come to have an eﬀect that is socially consequential
and graspable.
3.1. Social eﬀectivity
Knowing when a certain practice of intervention has been eﬀective is problematic in
general, full of contingencies and mismatched realities. But it is particularly so when
conceptualized as ‘the reﬂection of reﬂection’, for its peculiar impact may well be
overlooked and interpreted, instead, as a calculated outcome. As an empirical social
phenomenon, ‘eﬀectivity’ – the productivity of practice – becomes immediately dis-
cernible only on the condition of some pre-written or somehow pre-stated theory or
contract. And yet, as Butler manages to grasp in the quote cited in the introduction,
there can be a type of intervention that does not depart from any agreement or
manifested ‘theoretical presuppositions’. In such cases, when one is faced with the
absence of a readily applicable script or principle, the only methodological resource
left is, in Butler’s words, a ‘reﬂective posture’. The fact that one must come up with a
judgment about the question of eﬀectivity itself ex post facto does not mean that the
answer will be arbitrary or forever conﬁned to the realm of theory. It just means that
the usefulness of an assessment will only go as far as its ability to creatively gather the
‘grounds’ or strategic logic that a whole culture already more or less intuitively
associates with that practice.
Arendt carried out this kind of articulatory exercise in her classic book On
Revolution (Arendt 2006). In this text, she concentrates on the strange fact, long
perceived by historians, that the eighteenth-century revolutions were brought about
by rather conservative ‘men who were ﬁrmly convinced that they would do no more
than restore an old order of things that had been disturbed and violated by the
despotism of absolute monarchy or the abuses of colonial government’ (ibid., p.34).
And her deﬁant suggestion is that the actual, practical meaning of ‘revolution’ has
largely eluded and remained implicit and vague in the discourse of modern revolu-
tionaries, while political theorists, on their part, have been unable to fully illuminate
its ‘secret center of gravity’ (Wellmer 2000, p. 221). For a commentator on this work
like Albrecht Wellmer, this suggestion is only ‘radical in a philosophical sense of the
word’ (Wellmer 2000, p. 222, original emphasis), in the sense that it attempts to
introduce new categories into political thought. Yet if one departs from Butler’s
insight and agrees that the ‘grounds’ of certain practices of intervention are only
graspable on reﬂection, it becomes harder to underplay the empirical substance of
her suggestion.
Any revolutionary experience poses a problem of self-intelligibility, an ‘obscurity’, as
Markell (2010, p. 99) puts it. For it always consists, Arendt reﬂects, in coming to grips
both with ‘an entirely new beginning’ and with the ‘experience of being free’ to shape
that beginning (Arendt 2006, p. 27, 24). Such an event of political freedom does not
lend itself to easy interpretation. It appears as a challenge to those who come to enjoy
this freedom, since what they face is the uncertain question of how to deal from that
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moment on with their public aﬀairs, and the future that they share depends on their
own decisions, promises and deliberations (ibid., p. 206). If for Arendt ‘the shape of
revolutionary experience was peculiarly obscure to those who lived it’ (Markell 2010,
p. 99), it is because making sense of what one is doing and coming to grips with ‘the
reﬂection of reﬂection’ or the kind of reﬂection that is being reﬂected in practice is the
very mark of such experiences.
In spite of that obscurity, Arendt still insists on the notion that ‘revolution’ can act as
a normative criterion of evaluation. There is a kind of absolute measure or ‘secret center
of gravity’ in the revolutionary idea about what it means to successfully realize an
intervention. It is in fact a measure that is so absolute that she can conﬁdently sustain,
against the grain of much historical common sense, that the American Revolution was
much more revolutionary than the French one (see Markell 2010, p. 97). There is a
universalism in her account, even if, as Wellmer elucidates, it is only ‘the universalism
of a human possibility’ (Wellmer 2000, p. 229, original emphasis). But such a universal
norm would not have been the result of a planned eﬀort or calculated theory. Rather, it
would have been the unforeseen outcome of a surprising collective experience unique to
modern history, ‘unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of the eight-
eenth century’ (Arendt 2006, p. 18–19).
Even after having emerged in the perception of Western culture, Arendt’s thesis is that
the construct of ‘revolution’ could have only been applied as a criterion of social
eﬀectivity retroactively. Against conventional Marxist readings, she ﬁnds in revolution
the measure of a movement of public action that does more than initiate an unstoppable
event, force a violent change, overthrow an old regime, liberate a people or execute a
political mission – ‘the trouble has always been the same: those who went into the school
of revolution learned and knew beforehand the course a revolution must take’ (ibid.,
p. 47). If one wants to speak of something like the core experience of modern revolutions,
one must point instead to the opening up of a shared space or ‘island’ of freedom (ibid.,
p. 267), one that allows individuals to spontaneously engage in public aﬀairs and express
their political passions. In this sense, a successful revolution would be the one that
manages to give this space a ‘foundation’ or institutionalize the experience of political
freedom in some way – providing it with a constitutio libertatis (ibid., p. 247). Such a task
of foundation would have been from the beginning of the revolutionary tradition diﬃcult
to realize and conceptualize, since it is invariably one that must serve to guarantee a
phenomenon which in its essence is spontaneous, whose ‘preservation in some sense
amounts’, as Wellmer remarks, to its ‘continuous re-invention’ (Wellmer 2000, p. 229).
This is the eighteenth century ‘perplexity’ that Arendt believes ‘has haunted all revolu-
tionary thinking ever since’ (Arendt 2006, p. 224).
Arendt’s intention would not have been simply to theorize what revolution should
be. The validity of her claims reaches beyond her own philosophy. Her account of
revolution is rather a careful exercise in methodology: what method of assessment must
one use in order to be consistent with the strategy that a culture has put into motion?
After a certain initiative comes into being, which is by nature spontaneous, what eﬀects
should one expect and demand from it? What is, in other words, an eﬀective practice of
freedom? Constitutio libertatis or ‘the foundation of freedom’ is not something that can
be translated into a stable theoretical presupposition, but it does convey in a way that is
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agreeable and apprehensible enough what we would somehow expect as a culture from
a successful revolution.
3.2. Foundational fractures
Following Arendt as well as Foucault, Engin Isin has tackled the question of political
subjectivity through a rather extreme distinction between ‘rupture’ and ‘convention’,
suggesting that creative acts can only be investigated through disruptive events and
through ‘a vocabulary or analytics for understanding acts when subjects fail to follow
conventions’ (Isin 2012, p. 122, original emphasis). He traces the capacity of freedom to
produce an intervention in the ﬁeld of justice to those ‘actions that bring about events
as rupture in the order of things’ (ibid., p. 126). Conversely, I have read Arendt as a
pioneer in the methodological project of grasping the way relationships of freedom with
a certain potential for intervention can become institutionalized or at least thematized
through the formation of shared conventions. On Revolution can be read as an attempt
at articulating a criterion of eﬀectivity that is immanent to action, following the premise
that the expression of freedom that revolutionary practice embodies in Western culture
already has a discernible principle embedded in it. Arendt elaborates upon this premise
at some point:
The absolute from which the beginning is to derive its own validity and which must save it,
as it were, from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, together with it, makes its
appearance in the world . . . [Our language] still derives ‘principle’ from the Latin princi-
pium and therefore suggests this solution for the otherwise unsolvable problem of an
absolute in the realm of human aﬀairs which is relative by deﬁnition. (Arendt 2006, p. 205)
While a relation of freedom signals a kind of ‘rupture’, ‘beginning’ or irruptive event,
constituting, as it does, a challenge to the expected sequence of social interaction and
conduct of the self, the type of irruption that it creates is not always ‘arbitrary’, as
Arendt eloquently puts it. At times, a culture can develop a convention that manages to
explain the productivity or ‘principle’ that comes with it. A ‘convention’, in this sense,
does not entail what a norm normally does. It is not a doctrinal boundary of inclusions
and exclusions, a moral condition that is promised to those who adhere to a certain
form of behavior. It rather refers to the measure of a diﬃcult accomplishment. As a
shared point of reference, it evokes an image of what those relationships look like when
they have been successful. But it cannot guarantee that any such relationship, since they
are all based on the explosive expressiveness of freedom, will be productive. In brief,
instead of providing an ethical ‘absolute’ – a norm that applies to all cases, even when
said norm is recognized to be socially constructed – these conventions oﬀer a strategic
‘criterion of eﬀectivity’ – a guiding idea or parameter for the kinds of interventions that
can be eﬀective in constructing a certain social scenario out of freedom.8
To show how conventional a criterion of eﬀectivity for a relationship of freedom can
be we can take the example of ‘civility’, at least in the form Sennett (1992) historically
recovers it. Unlike other historical sociologists like Norbert Elias, Sennett ﬁnds that the
development of codes of courtesy, diplomatic conversation and other self-conscious
behaviors in European culture did not necessarily lead to a reduction in social hostility
by means of self-restraint and shame-driven self-surveillance. Norms of conduct such as
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being a ‘gentleman’ were, according to Sennett’s research, imagined and devised with
the explicit intention of making out of conversation a more pleasurable experience.
From its inception in the sixteenth-century literature about the courtier, civility would
have thus aimed at more than bodily discipline. It was meant to smoothly facilitate a
greater sociability in a hierarchical society, motivating the aristocrat to act politely and
modestly in front of others regardless of their rank (Sennett 2012, pp. 116–127).
3.3. Cultural sedimentation
In his seminal work, The Fall of Public Man, Sennett relates the modern understanding
of civility back to the kind of public game that allowed strangers to interact in the ﬁrst
truly diverse urban centers of the eighteenth century, like London or Paris, at a
comfortable distance (Sennett 1992, p. 17). The convention of ‘civility’ consists for
him in the wearing of a mask which incites strangers to fully engage with each other but
in a kind of impersonal manner (ibid., p. 264). That mask was for example created at
the time by dressing in an overly theatrical form in the street or by adopting a very
stylized form of speech in meeting places like the coﬀeehouse. In both cases, the
enactment of a certain public personae allowed strangers to talk to each other openly,
expressively, in a kind of ﬁctional mode, unburdened by the frictions, fears and general
wariness that come with any diﬀerence in occupational rank or social status.
Implicit in Sennett’s characterization of civility is an understanding of the individual
as a subject capable of relating to others successfully through freedom (see also
Haugaard 2016, p. 57–58). ‘Convention’, he says, referring to the social rituals and
verbal cues that signal and drive the embodiment of civility, ‘is itself the single most
expressive tool of public life’ (ibid., p. 37). It facilitates ‘the expression of certain creative
powers which all human beings possess potentially – the powers of play’ (ibid., p. 264).
He uses play and playacting as the explanatory references for this shared capacity for
free expression – for the reﬂection of reﬂection. Play of the kind children perform
among themselves, which as a general rule includes diﬀerential levels of skill dependent
on age, size and so on, is guided, he suggests, by respect for rules that were found at
some point to be satisfying for the enjoyment of all the players involved (ibid., p. 319).
Play, in this model presented by Sennett, highlights the crucial role that situational rules
can have in social interaction. They make ‘risk-taking’ possible, while ‘mastery over
others is put oﬀ’ (ibid., pp. 319–320). In this sense, the coﬀeehouse for instance appears
as the ﬁeld for a game that is contained in itself, in which the ‘rules’ or conventions of
sociability have been redeﬁned (ibid., p. 322):
Inside the coﬀeehouse, if the gentleman had decided to sit down, he was subject to the free,
unbidden talk of his social inferior. . . As men sit at the long table, telling stories of great
elaborateness . . . they have only to use their eyes and tune their ears to ‘place’ the stories or
descriptions as coming from one with the point of view of a petty-minded petty clerk, an
obsequious courtier, or a degenerate younger son of a wealthy merchant. But these acts of
placing the character of the speaker must never intrude upon the words these men use to
each other . . . a frown goes round the table if someone makes an allusion that may be
applied to the ‘person of any one of his hearers’. (ibid., p. 82)
Sennett’s treatment of civility illustrates a number of things. Firstly, it helps to clarify
that the challenge of expressing oneself freely is unrelated to the idea that there is an
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authentic self that one can strive to display by avoiding all social formalities and
embodying one’s genuine motivations. The reﬂection of one’s reﬂective eﬀorts does
not have to allude to a ‘quest for personality’ (ibid., p. 6) or even, as in the agoras of
Ancient Greece and beyond, for ‘ethical diﬀerentiation’ (Foucault 2012, p. 49). It can
appear through the ordinary use of a social mask that takes focus away from the self.
Secondly, these forms of civility show how quotidian and familiar a scene of freedom
can be – how ingrained into a culture a convention of this kind can become, function-
ing on an everyday basis, casually and indiscriminately between strangers. Finally, and
most important, Sennett’s study demonstrates how a convention like civility can
capture the success of a social scene in which a relationship of freedom has become
productive, establishing, for example, an engaging conversation between individuals
who, while having a diﬀerential of power, agree to let the other one talk unreservedly
and leave unmentioned one another’s rank and status.
Sennett probably brushed aside the many imaginable occasions in which the power-
ful would not have actually accepted playing this game once they heard what their
subordinates had to say, or it may be that the convention became so agreeable and
generalized that the game was for the most part successful. But what is revealing, in any
case, is that civility points, as a measure or criterion, to a situational game rather than
an absolute norm, to the acceptance of a certain set of mutual rules rather than the
tyranny of a ﬁxed standard that separates winners from losers. There is a strange
productivity when we observe human relations without the linear lens of power.
While we would usually expect from a ‘criterion of eﬀectivity’ to tell us when someone
‘wins’ or succeeds in reaching the endpoint in a certain game, ‘civility’ inside an
eighteenth-century coﬀeehouse tells us that there is a certain eﬀectivity simply when
a game of freedom gets to be played.
Once again, it is useful to go back to Foucault and his analysis of parrhesia if we want
to elucidate this counterintuitive production of eﬀectivity. The practice of speaking
truthfully to someone else, whether that someone was a prince or an ordinary citizen,
could not be eﬀective, Foucault emphasizes, unless that other person accepted playing
the parrhesiastic game:
The true game of parrhesia will be established on the basis of this kind of pact which
means that if the parrhesiast demonstrates his courage by telling the truth despite and
regardless of everything, the person to whom this parrhesia is addressed will have to
demonstrate his greatness of soul by accepting being told the truth. (Foucault 2012, p. 12)
Parrhesia can be said to be, for this reason, a cultural convention that marks the kind of
relationship in which the expression of freedom has not only been manifested, but has
also been reciprocated, at the very least with a listening gesture. Parrhesia cannot be a
predictive criterion that allows individuals to calculate their actions so as to reach a
certain outcome. It can only designate the event by which risky actions acquire an
actual eﬀectivity through a certain ‘retroaction’ (Foucault 2011, p. 68). As a cultural
term, it served to make reference to the successful establishment of a pact or game with
a powerful subject, but only after a certain courageous player had found himself in a
dramatically open situation, faced with binding yet poorly codiﬁed risks and eﬀects
(ibid., pp. 62–68).
266 C. PALACIOS
In the case of relationships of freedom, any criterion of eﬀectivity has to be retro-
active. And the reason is not that these relationships are bound to be creative, and the
‘truly creative’, as White (2008, p. 55) suggests, can only be gathered ‘in retrospect’.
After all, the calculations that govern relationships of power can also be creative, since
they tend to produce – as governmentality scholars have often stressed – applications
that diﬀer from the plan, which then feed back into the understanding and reﬁnement
of the original model. A relationship of freedom is simply productive in a diﬀerent way
to one of power (in which what matters is just to realize a calculation, for which
‘productive’ simply means eﬀecting a certain programme). The eﬀectivity of freedom is
possible, even in those cases where a more or less vague cultural criterion exists for the
situation in question, thanks to the risk involved in advancing that kind of relationship
and not in spite of it.
Many individuals who courageously ﬁnd themselves in dramatic situations never
manage to produce a relationship of freedom, even if they follow a procedure similar to
those who do succeed. What could be called the parrhesiastic game of listening to the
other’s truth just does not work out on every occasion, and on the occasions it does
work out, it cannot be said to have resulted from a well-executed maneuver. A relation-
ship of freedom always constitutes an event in itself. And, worse, every time a scenario
that reﬂects unique individual reﬂections reaches the threshold of social productivity to
become an event, its existence is threatened by the fact that its achievements are bound
to be episodic and transient insofar as they are attributable to courage. Freedom, from
this perspective, is to remain a problem.
4. Conclusion
One cannot prove that any relationship of freedom has ever actually come into
existence. This impossibility of proof has haunted the ﬁgure of the truth-teller
(Foucault 2011, p. 183) as much as that of the revolutionary (Arendt 2006, p. 86) and
of the subject of civil society (Kant 2012, p. 32). In purely empiricist terms, Foucault
might have even been right in believing that individuals are always playing the game of
‘the conduct of conducts’ (Foucault 2000, p. 341). The point, however, is that such a
belief cannot be proven either, and that one cannot equate Foucault’s sociological
purview to a phenomenological dictum of this empiricist sort (see e.g. Dean 2015).
He was, rather, interested in tracing the kinds of problems that our culture has put
forward for the interpretation of practice (see e.g. Rabinow 2003). To this extent,
‘power’ would simply have seemed for him to be a pervasive and enduring way of
problematizing experience in the Western tradition.
Conceiving the possibility that we, even as ‘subjects’ or cultural beings subjected to
the historicity of norms, are able to relate to each other through a problematic of
freedom opens up an opportunity for a ‘positive’ mode of Foucauldian critique (see
Blencowe 2013). The limitation of a strict sociology of power is not that it denies the
aspiration to social freedom. In fact, it immediately accepts that ‘power is not evil’
(Foucault 1997, p. 298) and can facilitate both fair and unfair political conditions. But
from a liberal-democratic perspective, it can be frustrating to have to prioritize the
importance that such a sociological departure places on suspicious questioning and
negative critique, even in those instances where the purpose of power is to enhance our
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socially determined capabilities for freedom (Haugaard 2016). While it may be urgent at
all times to disconnect ‘the growth of capabilities’ from ‘the intensiﬁcation of power
relations’ (Foucault 2007a, p. 116), one could at the very least – as part of a modern
historical conscience interested in improving the terms of human coexistence – prior-
itize a critical inquiry that asks whether a technology of power encourages the kind of
‘reﬂexive’ capabilities that are necessary for self-determination and equal participation
in society (e.g. Luxon 2008, Olson 2008).
This paper has not taken that route, however. It instead addresses the liberal-
democratic frustration by amending the original terms of Foucault’s sociological pro-
posal. Distinguishing the speciﬁcity of a ‘relationship of freedom’ does not change the
order of priorities in the post-structural critique of power. Rather, without appealing to
the humanist imperative, this distinction opens up a parallel ﬁeld of inquiry that is not
concerned with ‘contestability’ (Rose 1999, p. 60; Butler 2015, p. 29) but, rather, with
the identiﬁcation and even stabilization of certain norms, norms that are themselves the
product of a cultural critique of power. The ‘reﬂection of reﬂection’ captures a radically
diﬀerent problematic within our culture than that of the ‘conduct of conduct’, to which
a diﬀerent kind of questioning must be applied. It calls for ‘positive’ articulation and
almost Arendtian optics rather than a ‘negative’ methodological outlook of defamiliar-
ization and deconstruction.
This positive or constructive focus may still be one that is unwilling to tell us by
itself, in any universal manner, whether any such norm is deﬁnitely desirable and, most
important, whether any given social capability or human embodiment of freedom, such
as ‘reﬂexivity’, should be systematically targeted and enhanced. ‘Civility’, for example,
can be said to be susceptible to co-optation in the hands of normalizing political
programmes and should not be seen as a norm that invariably fosters something like
a ‘critical capability’ (Rose 1999); parrhesia is not exactly a capability for ‘resistance’ or
ethos of civil disobedience but rather a form of exposing oneself and in this sense
submitting oneself to the will of the powerful; ﬁnally, embracing a cultural narrative of
‘revolution’ or an ‘emancipatory capability’ would dismiss the fact that conservative
communities have usually been the ones capable of advancing a radical project of social
change (Calhoun 2012).
Nevertheless, if among the ways we produce ourselves as subjects, there are some
that are orientated away from the problem of power and the concomitant issues of
individual objectiﬁcation that come with the latter, then we should ascribe to them a
progressive force or at least potential. Nothing, not even freedom, can be assumed to be
impervious to criticism, while complex social organization, at any rate, is bound to
require a management of conducts. It may well be that not even those norms that are
arrived at through relations of freedom can avoid generating, with the passing of time, a
moralizing or exclusionary eﬀect of sorts. But, then again, we cannot expect the project
of freedom as a progressive force to be deﬁnable in terms of any absolute telos. A civil
society built upon relations of freedom should expect, at most, a ‘relative’ or always
revisable telos.9 Envisioned as a project or not, freedom is also part of how we act as
relational beings, and while hierarchies, calculation, persuasion and power may be
logistically unavoidable, freedom can still be considered to be a political compass to




1. The relative historicist depth of Foucault when compared to Arendt is well addressed and
clariﬁed, if somewhat indirectly, by Claire Blencowe (2010).
2. The reference to a skeptical ‘capacity’ is used here for the sake of clarity, but, as mentioned
before, Foucault refers to a much more ‘ontological condition’ or immanent potential, and,
therefore, as I brieﬂy discuss in the conclusion, it could serve as the basis of many diﬀerent
capabilities and ways of giving shape to a subject. Foucault invokes our capacity for
skepticism precisely to avoid reifying one or other form of the subject. Skepticism has
value for him, but it is not because one can assign to the ones who become skeptical in
historically unforeseeable ways a speciﬁable type of moral worth – such as a Socratic norm
of ‘respect for open-mindedness and ongoing investigation’ (see e.g. Vogt 2012). The
skeptical response only oﬀers a ‘strategic’ value (Foucault 2000, p. 347).
3. Even though I allude to Cynicism as a possible critical inference of Foucault’s sociological
approach and even though his late studies demonstrate a clear interest in Ancient skepti-
cism (Foucault 2012, p. 190), it must be emphasized that the skeptical capacity he theorizes
is in principle disconnected from Skepticism as an epistemological position or doctrine.
Such a ‘capacity’ simply captures the possibility that any individual, regardless of belief or
philosophical system, would have of considering alternative options or ways of thinking
about a proposition of conduct. This kind of capacity is rather irrelevant from the
perspective of ancient skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus (Vogt 2012, p. 150–151). What
the Foucauldian and Ancient ﬁgures of the skeptic do share, however, is a diﬃculty in
conceptualization since, without adhering to at least certain minimal beliefs (or parameters
of conduct mediated by power), a skeptic cannot think (Vogt 2012, ch.6). In the received
intepretation of Foucault, power has come to be equated so closely to the normative itself
that Butler for example resolves that if all freedom must be performed through inherited
normative notions, then the relevant question is how to eﬀect resistance in complicity
(Butler 1997b, p. 29–30). The way I can go beyond this residual interpretation of freedom
in this paper is by taking seriously the insight recently posed by Paul Kottman (2016), of
whether ‘there really is such a thing as “power” under which all kinds of social and cultural
norms can be subsumed and understood’ (emphasis added).
4. Only in the rather ﬁgurative case of Pericles one sees a governor who governs through
parrhesia (Foucault 2011, p. 176–177). But, in general, the practice of parrhesia is simply
the agonistic game of discursive confrontation by which the citizens of the polis can
achieve the virtuous ascendancy that is required to govern with democratic legitimacy
(ibid., pp. 157–158). The right to govern is gained through ‘imprecation’, by letting the
weak confront the powerful (ibid., p. 135).
5. While Foucault uses a variation of the term ‘reﬂection’ when he deﬁnes ethics as ‘the
considered [réﬂéchie] practice of freedom’ (Foucault 1997, p. xxv), in his case this
terminology has the opposite function to the one I intend to give it here. For Foucault,
it serves to qualify – as its tense for example reveals – the practice of freedom as always
being an already calculated exercise of conduct.
6. In this sense, my use of ‘reﬂection’ is diametrically opposed to that of anthropologist David
Graeber, who uses it to diﬀerentiate ‘the power to act directly on others’, or what he calls
‘action’, from ‘the power to deﬁne oneself in such a way as to convince others how they
should act toward you’ (Graeber 2001, p. 104). The way a woman or a king persuades
others to treat them in a certain way through a calculated display of the self is for Graeber
a form of power that can be deﬁned, rather cross-culturally, as a matter of ‘reﬂection’
(ibid., pp. 94–99). In our case, acting upon others through this cross-cultural form of
relating to self still belongs to the sphere of the conduct of conduct (see Dean 1995).
7. For Foucault, the ‘conduct’ of ‘conduct’ is a suitable deﬁnition for power in contemporary
academic debates to the extent that it can be derived in a historicist fashion from the
thought of Western culture itself as a form of problematization relevant to our modern
experience (Foucault 2007b, p. 193). What started as a pastoral concern with the thorough
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL POWER 269
management of souls for the sake of salvation eventually translated, after the crisis of the
Christian pastorate, into a pervasive secular concern with adequate government in general.
The sixteenth century was witness to an explosion of ‘needs of conduct’ (Foucault 2007b,
p. 231) at all societal levels of authority, a problematization that by the eighteenth century
had been consolidated into a recognizable political project for rendering entire populations
‘governmentable’ (Foucault 2008, p.294) or guidable towards a collaborative form of
conduct in spite of their own interests and passions.
8. This is a distinction that goes beyond the one Foucault draws between ‘morality’ and
‘subjectivation’ (see e.g. Luxon 2008, p. 388–391) and that rather approximates the one I
have drawn in another context between ‘ethics’ and ‘strategics’ (Palacios 2018).
9. For this conclusion, I am borrowing the distinction between an absolute and relative telos
drawn by Dean and Villadsen (2016, p. 142). While they apply it critically to the analysis of
Foucault’s work on liberal politics and civil society (as a way of ascribing to him a certain
teleological remainder), my point is that such a distinction can become important and
acquire consistency once the possibility of relationships of freedom has been opened up as
a tenable ﬁeld of concerns within the Foucauldian tradition.
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